Recent news in Israel fails to shock Americans, even though it is rocking Israeli Religious Zionism to its core. A number of leading rabbis announced they would open a private conversion court. After years of trying to change the laws, attain the position of Chief Rabbi and negotiate with the Chief Rabbinate, Rav David Stav, Rav Nahum Rabinovitch and others have decided to proceed without the Chief Rabbinate. This has scandalized some of their colleagues, leading to public denouncements and confrontations. What is going on?
Ideology and Politics
Two simultaneous issues are being debated here, one ideological and the other halachic. For decades, the Chief Rabbinate has been summarily ignored by Charedi and secular Israelis, except reluctantly when required by law. The primary constituency of the Chief Rabbinate is the Religious Zionist community, which can roughly be broken into moderate (Dati Leumi) and stringent (Chardal) factions.
Recently, Charedim (appear to) have taken control of the Chief Rabbinate, including the positions of Chief Rabbi, religious judges and many bureaucratic positions. Their decisions largely do not reflect the religious sentiments of Religious Zionists. In turn, the Religious Zionist public is increasingly looking to its leading rabbis, rather than the Chief Rabbis, for spiritual and halachic guidance. In other words, the Chief Rabbinate has lost its main constituency. The cynical among us may claim this was a Charedi plot to destroy the Chief Rabbinate.
Currently, the Chief Rabbinate’s main role is kosher certification, conversion and marriage. Charedim have their own private kosher certifications, marriage registrars and conversion courts. Recently, Religious Zionists (Dati Leumi) have experimented with private kosher certification and non-Rabbinate weddings. Now, leading Dati Leumi rabbis have announced a private conversion court. Critics, particularly among leading Chardal rabbis, charge this initiative with significantly chipping away at the authority of the Chief Rabbinate. What will be left for the institution if Religious Zionists undermine its remaining authority with private initiatives?
While this is certainly a political argument, it is primarily ideological. Religious Zionists, particularly among the Chardal, see the Chief Rabbinate in messianic terms. We pray three times a day in the Amidah for the return of the centralized religious judicial system. The Chief Rabbinate is not the fulfillment of that prayer but its precursor. It represents a step in the flowering of the Redemption. Seen in those terms, undermining the Chief Rabbinate is forestalling Mashiach. The better strategy is to improve the Chief Rabbinate.
The rabbis instituting this change can counter that this, alone, will not undermine the Chief Rabbinate; the Rabbinate has already fallen, we just need to realize it; or that their well-publicized efforts to reform the Rabbinate from within have failed and this is their attempt to force reform from without. Alternatively, perhaps they reject the messianic view of the Chief Rabbinate and take a pragmatic approach. Maybe they believe that if the institution serves the entire Jewish people, it can do wonders. However, if it fails in its purpose then it should be replaced by other mechanisms to serve the public. Those are the political-ideological issues. There is an additional halachic element to the debate.
Converting Minors
As I understand it, the new conversion court will only serve children with Jewish fathers but gentile mothers who attend religious public schools (although some critics worry that this court will open the door to other, more liberal courts). These rabbis believe that a child can be converted to Judaism without accepting the commandments. Nearly 20 years ago, Rav Nahum Rabinovitch wrote a responsum on the subject so his view is easily confirmed (published as Siach Nachum, no. 68).
The basic problem with converting a child is that children are halachically incapable of accepting on themselves an obligation. While this is obvious regarding infants, it applies equally to anyone who has not reached maturity. How can a child convert to Judaism when acceptance of commandments is a fundamental element of conversion? How do adopted babies become Jewish?
The Gemara (Kesubos 11a) states that a child is converted with the intent of the court. Effectively, the officiating rabbis stand in the place of the individual converting (I am being imprecise because there are competing interpretations of this Talmudic statement). The Gemara continues that since I can give you something that benefits you without your knowledge or acceptance, a court can confer Judaism on a child without his (legally accepted) knowledge. The issue then becomes when becoming Jewish is a benefit and when not. If the child will likely violate Shabbos and eat non-kosher as an adult, does the probable divine punishment render the conversion a detriment to the child?
This rose to the fore in 1864 when R. Bernard Ilowy of New Orleans sent a halachic query to Europe: Can a mohel circumcise the son of a Jewish father and a gentile mother? Two great European rabbis debated the issue. Rav Tzvi Hirsch Kalischer permitted circumcising and converting the baby to Judaism even though the child will not observe the Torah. Rav Azriel Hildesheimer argued at length to forbid (see Responsa Rav Azriel, vol. 1 nos. 229-230).
Subsequent authorities generally follow one of three positions regarding converting a child whose parents are not mitzvah observant:
1. You can only convert a child if he will most likely observe the commandments. Significantly, Rav Avraham Kook followed this approach (Responsa Daas Kohen, nos. 147-149).
2. You can convert a child if he will probably observe the commandments. For example, if given a Jewish education, there is a good chance he will begin observing Shabbos and keeping kosher, then the conversion is a benefit. Rav Joseph Soloveitchik followed this approach (Nefesh Ha-Rav, p. 245).
3. Merely becoming Jewish is a benefit, regardless of whether the convert becomes observant. While this will not help adults, who must accept mitzvah observance order to convert, it permits conversion of a child who must only obtain a benefit for the court to act on his behalf. Rav Moshe Feinstein seems to have accepted this approach (Iggeros Moshe, Even Ha-Ezer 4:26:3).
Rav Nahum Rabinovitch follows this third view (as did Rav Shlomo Goren). Additionally, since these children are in religious schools, there is a chance that they will become observant. More importantly, since they socialize with their schoolmates as peers, they may find their life mate in school. These conversions prevent intermarriage. This is significantly different from the question previous generations faced—converting the child of an intermarriage which would facilitate, perhaps even encourage, intermarriage.
However, most of today’s critics are students of Rav Kook’s disciples and, given his strict view, they understandably disagree with this leniency. They also point out that these converted children are part of the Russian-Israeli community and may very likely marry a non-converted child of a gentile mother. These conversions may actually increase intermarriage, at least until and if the new conversion activity becomes widespread.
Ultimately, we are dealing with great rabbis debating an important communal issue. Regardless of where you stand, you should recognize that both sides are acting with halachic support and the intent to improve the Jewish community.
By Rabbi Gil Student
